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The workhorse model of the New Trade Theory fails to explain four strong and central 
patterns of postwar trade data. These patterns are, first, the massive increase in trade 
volumes, second, the small fraction of traded varieties the average country imports, 
third the correlation between per capita income growth and trade growth, and fourth, the 
correlation between trade growth and growth in the number of source countries per 
imported good. The present paper shows that a small and reasonable change in the 
demand structure can reconcile the model with the data. It departs from standard theory 
by assuming that consumers derive bounded marginal utility from varieties. This 
implies that consumers purchase only the cheaper share of varieties and that expensive 
foreign varieties bearing high transport costs are not imported. Technological progress 
which increases per capita consumption of the varieties in the consumption basket 
decreases marginal utility derived from each of them and induces consumers to extend 
their consumption to more expensive varieties produced at more distant locations. This 
additional margin along which trade can expand induces a substantial increase in the 
trade share as productivity grows. Productivity change is thus identified as a joint 
determinant of trade shares, the number of source countries per good, and per capita 
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and Patterns of Trade
Philip SaurØ1
1 Introduction
The impact of Krugman￿ s (1980) workhorse model on trade theory can hardly be
overestimated. As the most successful formalization of the New Trade Theory, it
inspired research on economic agglomeration, trade agreements and economic devel-
opment, sparked o⁄ the New Economic Geography and the literature on trade and
heterogeneous ￿rms, and hence reaches far beyond the analysis of the home market
e⁄ect and intra-industry trade it originally set out to explain. The model is one of
the building blocks of modern trade theory.
Yet recent literature has pointed out strong and important regularities of trade data
that seem to indicate some limitations of the New Trade Theory. These regularities
are, ￿rst, the massive growth of trade volumes, second, the tiny fraction of tradable
varieties that countries tend to purchase, third, the parallel growth of per capita
income and trade, fourth and ￿nally, the strong correlation between trade growth
and the growth in the number of source countries per imported good.
The spectacular rise in trade shares is well-known. After Krugman￿ s (1995) ac-
count of the surprisingly divergent views concerning its causes, Baier and Bergstrand
(2001) singled out tari⁄ reductions as its most important determinant. Yi (2003)
subsequently pointed out that the observed increases in world trade shares imply
an excessive import elasticity in standard trade models (see also Bergoeing et al
(2004) on this point). Substantial progress was made in explaining this "elasticity
puzzle" as it was later labeled (see Yi (2003), Ruhl (2005), and Cuæat and Ma⁄ez-
zoli (2006)). However, the New Trade Theory remains unable to square the raise of
trade volumes at reasonable import elasticities.
1I would like to thank Giancarlo Corsetti, Gino Gancia, Omar Licandro, Marco Ma⁄ezzoli, Diego
Puga, Morten Ravn, Karl Schlag, Jaume Ventura, and Joachim Voth for many valuable comments
and helpful discussions.
1Haveman and Hummels (1999) observed the second empirical regularity. De￿ning
varieties as goods di⁄erentiated by production origin,2 the authors report that "im-
porters purchase a very small fraction of available varieties," while standard models
predict that each country imports all varieties from all trade partners. The au-
thors conclude that the data suggest that standard theory "considerably overstates
the extent of specialization [...] or the degree to which consumers value varieties,"
and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) acknowledge that their observation is an
"important drawback of the existing theory.￿
The third observation concerns the nature of the rise in trade volumes. Figure 1
illustrates with US data and the aggregate world data of the period 1972 to 2000
that the growth of trade was paralleled by an increase of per capita income. Ventura
(2005) puts forward that the data strongly suggest a positive relation between trade
growth and growth in per capita income. The New Trade Theory, however, predicts
that trade shares and productivity parameters are entirely orthogonal, so that any
correlation of per capita income and trade variables remains outside its framework.
Finally, Broda and Weinstein (2004) report a substantial expansion of the number of
source countries per imported good for all of the 20 largest importers over the period
1972 to 2000. This increase re￿ ects a dynamic aspect of the second observation
above. Countries tend to purchase each of their imports from an increasing number
of trade partners which they had previously excluded from the set of suppliers.
Figure 2 illustrates that the expansion of the average number of source countries per
good closely parallels the increase of the import share in the US data. Disaggregating
these data by good categories (HTS and TSUSA) con￿rms this pattern: Figure 3
shows a strong correlation between changes in trade volumes and changes in the
average number of countries from 1972 to 2000. Finally, relying on bilateral trade
data of 188 countries by 4-digit SITC good categories, Figure 4 repeats this plot
adding a country dimension. The graph exhibits the same strong correlation between
changes in import volumes and in the origin margin. Once again, the New Trade
Theory has nothing to say about the trend nor the observed correlations.
In sum, there are four strong and central patterns of international trade which the
New Trade Theory fails to address thus leading one to the temptation to downgrade
the model as an analytical instrument for trade theory. The present paper shows
that this is not necessary. It argues that a small and realistic deviation from the
standard demand structure goes a long way in alleviating the listed drawbacks.
This paper￿ s key assumption is that consumers￿marginal utility derived from each
variety is bounded. This twist in the demand structure implies that consumers buy
only the cheaper fraction of varieties and exclude the too expensive ones from their
consumption basket. Varieties from very distant destinations - the varieties that are
expensive due to large trade costs - are therefore not purchased. This explains the
2This is a common de￿nition od variety. It departs form earlier de￿nitions. The present paper
follows Krugman (1980) and identi￿es a variety by the ￿rm that produces it.
2observation of void bilateral trade relations in some sectors. Moreover, the change
in demand patterns implies that technological progress, when it is biased towards
the marginal production cost, raises the number of source countries per good. The
reason for this e⁄ect is slightly more subtle. A decreasing ratio of ￿xed costs over
marginal cost induces a higher per capita consumption of varieties already consumed
and marginal utility derived from each of them falls. At the same time marginal
utility of varieties outside the consumption basket stays trivially constant. This
shift of the ratio of marginal utility means that varieties outside the consumption
basket become more attractive and consumers expand their consumption basket.
Consequently, the number of source countries for a given import good rises.
As the consumption basket expands towards the more expensive foreign varieties,
it goes together with reallocation of expenditure towards imported varieties. Thus,
productivity growth becomes a joint determinant of trade shares and the number of
source countries per good, which hence explains the observed correlation between
both (Figures 2-4). Finally, the model generates the positive correlation of trade
shares and per capita income since growth of marginal productivity positively a⁄ects
both of them.
In this way, the workhorse model of the New Trade Theory, albeit slightly mod-
i￿ed on the demand side, qualitatively explains the four empirical regularities the
standard version failed to address. In order to evaluate to what extend it is able to
alleviate the drawbacks quantitatively, a simple calibration exercise is performed. It
shows that technological progress can account for about half of the observed increase
in trade shares while the other half of the increase remains to be explained by the fall
in trade costs, i.e. by reductions in tari⁄s and transport costs. The relatively mod-
est reductions of US data then explain the data with a time-average of 3.6, which is
still on the high side of estimates for elasticities (it peaks at an 8.8 in 1972 and is
lowest in 2000 with a values of 1.7). Nevertheless, it constitutes substantial progress
compared with the standard New Trade Model, which implies import elasticities
well over 10 when explaining the trade shares with trade cost reductions only. In
sum, the assumption of bounded marginal utility on the variety level thus goes a
long way to alleviate the three shortcomings of the standard New Trade Model and
brings it much closer to the data in these important dimensions.
The present paper is not the ￿rst to analyze the role of non-homothetic demand for
trade shares. A number of authors have formalized and tested the Linder Hypoth-
esis according to which bilateral trade volumes correlate positively with per capita
income similarity due to the fact that per capita income determines the demand pat-
terns and output structure of countries (see Thursby and Thursby (1987), Fran￿oise
and Kaplan (1996), and Hallak (2004)). Closer predecessors of the present paper
are Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand (1990) who assume Stone-Geary preferences,
so that consumers cover a minimum level of a homogenous, domestically produced
good before demanding aggregates of imported varieties. The present model does
3not impose such asymmetries on demand but assumes equal valuation of varieties
for consumers, while the cost of transportation creates endogenous asymmetries in
demand via its e⁄ects on consumer prices. In a recent paper that stands somewhat
out of this literature Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005) use a Lancester-type utility to
analyze the role of market size and per capita income on the market structure and
international trade. They predict - and empirically con￿rm - that "richer consumers
will pay more for varieties closer matched to their ideal types". Consequently, higher
per capita income markets are more segmented and own-price elasticities are lower,
while the market size has opposite e⁄ects. In this respect, Hummels and Lugovskyy
(2005) are very much in line with present paper, which takes the observed regular-
ities of demand as a starting point and formulates them in reduced form to derive
predictions concerning trade ￿ ows and the number of source countries per good.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 reviews a
standard multi-country New Trade Model and brie￿ y discusses the three drawbacks.
Section 3 introduces the change in the demand structure, showing the progress that
can be made there. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Standard New Trade Model
The present section aims to illustrate some implications of the Krugman (1980)
model that stand in blatant contrast to the data. These implications are, ￿rst,
that all countries consume all tradable goods and varieties from all countries at all
times, second, that trade shares are independent of technologies and therefore of per
capita income, and third, that trade shares react modestly to tari⁄reductions under
realistic elasticities. To highlight these problems, the new trade model with a set of
I di⁄erent countries is brie￿ y reviewed in the following.
Demand. Each country i 2 I is populated with identical individuals who have
the following Cobb-Douglas preference structure over a nontradable good Di and a






The composite Ci aggregates the consumed quantities cij of the varieties j 2 J which







The constant share of expenditure on the nontradable D will be read as the local
content of the average variety. By the Cobb-Douglas structure the expenditure
share on D is constant and the local content is 1￿￿ throughout. When expenditure
4in county i equals Wi, the constant expenditure shares further allow to write the
sub-budget constraints on the composite of varieties as
Z
J
qijcijdj ￿ ￿Wi (3)
where qij is the consumer price of the variety j in country i. Finally, consumer
optimization of the variety composite implies cij ￿ q￿"
ij so that the own-price demand
elasticity is ".
Supply. In each of the I countries the nontradable good D is produced com-
petitively with a constant returns to scale technology
D = LD (4)
The tradable varieties are produced according to the increasing returns to scale
technology
Lj = ￿ + ￿xj (5)
where Lj is labor and xj is output of ￿rm j. The positive parameter ￿ represents
a setup or entry cost in terms of units of labor while ￿ is the marginal unit labor
requirement. There is an unlimited pool of potential entrants into the market and
each active ￿rm produces one variety. Firms engage in monopolistic competition,
and free entry into production ensures that operating pro￿ts just cover the setup
cost.
Prices. In the competitive nontradable sector prices trivially equal wages within
each country. In the tradable sector, international trade costs drive a wedge between
producer and consumer prices. In particular, it will be assumed that shipments from
country k to country i require the payment of a gross iceberg-type transport cost
￿ki. Consequently, in country i the consumer price of a variety j that is produced
in country k is qij = ￿ikpij where pij is the price net of transport cost ￿rm j sets
in country i. In order to maximize pro￿ts, monopolists charge the constant markup
"=(" ￿ 1) over marginal cost. As all ￿rms located in a given country face the same
production and pricing decisions, the prices of monopolists located in country k are





Note that the marginal production cost in country k is the product of marginal unit
labor requirement ￿ and the local wage wk. With the monopolist prices (6) the
relative consumer price of either pair of varieties equals the iceberg cost times the
wage ratios. Thus, individual optimality condition for each country i requires
cik = cii (￿kiwk=wi)
￿" (7)
5This equation implies the well-known fact that all individuals consume all varieties
in positive quantities.3 This implies that whenever a country exports a good, it
exports it to all countries worldwide, a prediction that stands in stark contrast to
the trade patterns Haveman and Hummels (1999) report. In particular, the authors
￿nd that "importers purchase a very small fraction of available varieties" traded on
the world market.
As a lemma of this ￿nding, the number of source countries of the imported good
equals the number of the rest-of-the-world countries and is, in particular, constant in
the parameters of the model.4 This constitutes the second contradiction to the data
since, as Broda and Weinstein (2004) report, countries have substantially increased
the number of source countries per imported good over the past decades.
Equilibrium. Regardless of prices and income, the expenditure on the non-
tradable good is 1 ￿ ￿ so that, since prices are handed through as factor rewards,
the equilibrium labor allocation in the nontradable sector equals (1 ￿ ￿)Li in each
country i. In the following description of the equilibrium, the trivial allocations in
the nontradable sector will be neglected.
The equilibrium in the traded sector is determined by the sub-budget constraint,
the resource constraint, and the trade balance for all countries i 2 I. When writing
nk for the number of varieties produced in country k, and under the assumption that
individuals spend all their labor income on consumption, the individual sub-budget
constraint (3) in country i becomes
X
k
nk￿kipkcik = ￿wi (8)
The resource constraint requires that within each country i the labor demand in the























3The cases of zero or in￿nite wage in one country can readily be ruled out.
4This is of course true only under the implicit assumption that the number of countries in the
world is constant. The increase in the number of nations that actually took place is, however, by
far insu¢ cient to explain the rise in the number of source countries per good.
6and determines with (6) and (8) the number of active ￿rms in each country
ni = ￿Li=(￿") (11)
which does not depend on whether and how much countries trade. Using the mo-
nopolist prices (6), the consumer optimality condition (7) and the number of ￿rms





1￿" = (" ￿ 1)￿=￿ (12)

















1￿" = 1 (13)
for all i 2 I. Up to normalization, this system determines the wages wi and together
with (6), (7), (11), and (12) describes the equilibrium.5 Notice that wages depend
only on transport costs, the relative country-sizes and the substitution elasticity.














is independent of technology. This independence of technological progress and trade
shares constitutes a third mismatch of the new trade model regarding the data. As
Ventura (2005) points out, time series as well as cross section data of trade and per
capita income strongly suggest a positive interconnection of productivity growth and
trade shares. The model is unable to deliver such patterns.
As Yi (2003) demonstrates, the observed increases in world trade volumes imply
an excessive import elasticity in conventional models. Two simple calibration exer-
cises shall show in the following that the new trade model is no exception in that
respect. First, a two-country version of the model is fed with data on population size
and trade costs. Population data for the US and the ROW are taken from the ERS
International Macroeconomic Data Set and the US tari⁄ and the cif/fob measure of
5For existence see the appendix. By summing up over i it is con￿rm to check that the system
does not have full rank. The missing rank re￿ ects the fact that the trade balance of the last country
holds if all other countries have balanced trade.
7transport costs from Feenstra et al (2002). Trade costs are assumed to be the sum
of trade-weighted tari⁄s and the cif/fob measure (both from the US data) plus 40%.
The latter number is the "border cost" estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004). The elasticity of substitution " and the parameter ￿ are used to calibrate
the trade shares to the data at the initial and ￿nal period of the time interval con-
sidered. As Figure 4a shows, this is not possible: for the values (";￿) = (11:9;1)
the rise in the trade share is maximal; for higher elasticities, the initial trade share
drops below the 4.5% observed in the data. The implied import elasticity6 of this
model takes an average of 11.5 with the maximum of 11.6 and a minimum of 11.47.
At these excessive elasticities, the model is able to explain little less than 70% of the
increase in the trade share. As Yi (2003) states, standard theory cannot explain the
rise of the trade share without assuming excessive import elasticities and, in this
particular case of the new trade model, even then it only partially matches the US
import data between 1972 and 2000.
Second, a symmetric model of 20 equally-sized countries is fed with the trade
cost data (the US population equals about 1/20 of the world population in the time
interval considered). Each country has a set of 19 trade partners and faces a vector
of bilateral trade costs. This vector of trade cost is assumed to be, up to reordering,
identical across countries and is denoted by ￿ = (￿1;￿2;:::;￿M￿1). Without loss of
generality, assume that these ￿m are ordered according to ascending values. Finally,
the bilateral trade costs are a composite of tari⁄s t and transportation cost ￿ and are
assumed to take the linear form ￿m = 1:4 + t + ￿ (m=(M ￿ 1))
￿. For each period,
the value ￿ is chosen so that the cif/fob measure implied by the model coincides
with the value implied by the data. Here again, " and ￿ are chosen to calibrate
the trade shares to the data at the initial and ￿nal period of the time interval
considered. Figure 4b shows that with (";￿;￿) = (14:535;1;1:9) the multi-country
model explains almost 90% of the observed increase in the trade share, yet still
at a very high import elasticity, averaging 10:16 (the minimum and maximum are,
respectively, 10:02 and 10:21). To understand where this improvement of ￿t stems
from, notice that in presence of positive tari⁄s t > 0, any reduction in ￿ reduces the
transportation costs for varieties from more distant countries relatively more than
those from close countries. Consequently, a reduction in ￿ induces an increase in
imports that is particularly pronounced for varieties from distant countries. This,
in turn, implies an upward bias is the cif/fob measure. To meet that measure in the
data, the parameter ￿ must drop by more than the cif/fob measure in the data.
The major problem of this calibration is clearly the excessive import elasticity,
which is needed to generate a substantial rise in trade shares in response to reductions
in trade costs. Another, possibly less obvious, drawback stems from the fact that
6The import elasticity does not equal " since at positive trade shares a change of import prices
leads to a partial allocation towards domestic goods. This e⁄ect tends to reduce the implied import
elasticity. This reduction is larger for commodities with a higher the expenditure share; thus the
implied import elasticity drops over time with a rising trade share.
8the measured cif/fob measure implies the strong drop in the parameter ￿, which
then accounts for about 80% of the rise in trade share. This dominant role of the
drop in transport cost contradicts the ￿nding of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) who
estimate the e⁄ect of decreases in transport cost on bilateral trade volumes to be
small relative to that of tari⁄ cuts.
This section has shown that the multi-country version of the Krugman (1980)
model mismatches the data in four important dimensions: ￿rst, it fails to explain the
rise in trade volumes at reasonable elasticities; second, it predicts that all countries
import all tradable varieties and, third, consequently fails to account for the rise in
source countries per imported good; fourth, it predicts no response of trade shares to
productivity and thus generates zero correlation between trade shares and per capita
income. These shortcomings, however, do not imply that the model is misshaped to
address those issues. As the following section will show, a reasonable change in the
models structure su¢ ces to set it back on track and make substantial progress in all
four dimensions.
3 New Trade and Bounded Marginal Utility
This section will show that a mild change in the above setup goes a long way in
alleviating the shortcomings of Krugman￿ s (1980) workhorse model, illustrated in
the previous section. The change in the setup concerns the demand structure, and
will be introduced next.
Demand. As in the previous section, consumers derive utility from the two
￿nal goods D and C according to (1). Within the composite of tradables consumers
love variety but, in contrast to the previous section, the marginal utility derived
from each of the varieties is supposed to be bounded. This latter feature constitutes
a major departure from standard literature and is central to the results below.
Preference structures with these characteristics have been used to study topics in
trade literature and it will be convenient to follow an important precursor and




ln(cij + 1)dj (14)
where again cij are the consumed quantities of variety j. Again, with qij as the
price of variety j in country i the demand curve of an individual located in market
i is derived by maximizing utility (14) subject to the sub-budget constraint (3).
Individual demand is then
cij = maxf1=(￿iqij) ￿ 1;0g (15)
where ￿i stands for the shadow price on the budget constraint.








Supply. Production takes place as speci￿ed in the previous section. The non-
tradable D is produced competitively at constant returns to scale (4) while varieties
are produced with technology (5). Firms produce one variety each and engage in
monopolistic competition in each market.
Prices. Here again, prices trivially equal the wages in the competitive non-
tradable sector. In the tradable sector, ￿rms can price-discriminate across di⁄erent
countries by assumption and consequently a ￿rm j sets the price pij for market i
in order to maximize its operating pro￿ts ￿ij in that speci￿c market. When ￿rm
j is located in country k and gross iceberg-type trade costs between country k and
country i are ￿ki ￿ 1, the consumer price in country i of variety j is the qij = ￿kipij.
Firm j that is in located in country k makes a pro￿t in the market i that amounts
to ￿ij = Li￿kicji(pij ￿ wk￿). Here, Li is the number of individuals in the market
i and wk is the wage in country k; hence wk￿ is the marginal cost of production.
With local demand (15), ￿rm j￿ s pro￿ts are thus
￿ji = Li￿ki (1=(￿i￿kipji) ￿ 1)(pji ￿ wk￿) (17)




for each market i separately. Here again, within each country ￿rms are all identical
and charge the same prices in a given market so that prices can be indexed by
country of origin and country of destination.
Under free entry to production, total operating pro￿ts, i.e. the sum of a ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts in each market, are equal to setup costs.
3.1 Closed Economy (I = 1)
Assume that international transport costs are too high to allow any kind of trans-
border trade. Countries are in autarky and can be analyzed by looking at one
representative closed economy, within which transport costs are negligible (￿ii = 1).
Dropping country indices, ￿rm j in the economy then sets its price according to
(18). As all ￿rms are identical in equilibrium , the shadow price on the sub-budget
constraint satis￿es 1=￿ = pj(cj + 1) ￿ p(c + 1) and the monopolist prices are
p = (c + 1)w￿ (19)
10Note that the monopolist markup over marginal cost is c + 1 and the demand elas-
ticity from (15) equals " = (c + 1)=c. The speci￿c demand structure assumed in
(14) thus implies that the own-price elasticity of varieties depends on quantities
consumed, is larger than unity and, in particular, unbounded. Consequently, in
the context of the present paper, whose motivation partly rests on the "elasticity-
puzzle", i.e. on the discrepancy between measured import elasticities and the ob-
served rise in trade volumes, a calibration of the model is inevitable to asses the
implied import elasticities at observed trade shares.
With the prices (19), the operating pro￿t of the representative ￿rm is
￿ = Lc(w￿(c + 1) ￿ w￿) = w￿Lc2 (20)







Equation (21) shows that, quite intuitively, an increase in setup over marginal costs
(￿=￿) increases per capita consumption of the average variety. At higher values
of ￿=￿, varieties are relatively more costly to produce and are produced in lesser
quantities so that the per capita consumption of each rises. Conversely, at increasing
population size (L), there is more demand for varieties, which increases the number
of active ￿rms and reduces per capita consumption of each single variety.
The equilibrium number of active ￿rms, n, is ￿nally pinned down by combining
the conditions of labor market clearing (n[￿x+￿] = ￿L) and goods market clearing







Observe that the number of active ￿rms is determined by technology parameters,
the population and market size. The di⁄erence between the two latter parameters
is noteworthy. Market size, de￿ned as total expenditure on varieties (￿L), enters
the number of ￿rms linearly, i.e. an increase in market size induces a proportional
rise in the number of active ￿rms. Population size, however, enters expression (22)
separately and, holding the market size ￿xed, tends to reduce the number of ￿rms.
For an intuition of that ￿nding remember that demand elasticity decreases with per
capita consumption. Now compare two economies, the ￿rst with a double labor
force but half the parameter ￿ of the second. Both economies spent the same total
amount of resources to produce varieties, yet per capita expenditure of the ￿rst
economy is half of the second. Now, if the number of ￿rms was equal, this would
imply that per capita consumption of each variety in the ￿rst economy is half of
those in the second. This, in turn, would mean that demand elasticities are larger
11in the ￿rst economy, and hence monopolist markups and pro￿ts are lower so that
￿nally ￿rms in the ￿rst economy made less pro￿ts than in the second. However,
by the free entry condition, ￿rms￿total pro￿ts must be zero in each country, which
means that the number of ￿rms has to adjust: the ￿rst economy has less active
￿rms in equilibrium. Thus, in addition to market size, per capita demand is a key
determinant of the number of ￿rms. This characteristic is very much unlike the one
in the classical new trade model where, due to homothetic preferences, the market
size matters exclusively (not per capita expenditure on varieties; compare (11)).
In the present model, the overall e⁄ect of an increase in population L on the
number of ￿rms is still positive, but, due to the demand e⁄ects discussed above, it
is less than proportional. Consequently, an increase in population size induces a less
than proportional drop of per capita consumption of the average variety.
3.2 Two Countries (I = 2)
Assume now that trade costs between two countries fall to a level where agents
engage in international trade. To save notation, the variables of, say, the second of
the countries will be marked by an asterisk. Individuals in one country can purchase
varieties produced outside of their country when incurring an iceberg-type transport
cost. In other words, for every unit of a variety to arrive at its destination, ￿ > 1
units of it have to leave the producer￿ s country.
Firms maximize pro￿ts in each country separately, i.e. they can by assumption
price discrimination across countries. Thus, the prices that ￿rms charge in the
domestic and foreign markets need to be distinguished. Let these prices be (pd;pf)
for ￿rms located in country 1 and (p￿
d;p￿
f) for ￿rms located in country 2 and denote
with (cd;cf) and (c￿
d;c￿
f) the quantities consumed in the respective country. Just as
in the previous section, a ￿rm￿ s optimal price in the domestic market is
pd = (cd + 1)w￿ and p￿
d = (c￿
d + 1)w￿￿ (23)





in their respective domestic market. But in addition to activities in the domestic
market, ￿rms sell in the export market. A ￿rm that is located in one country maxi-
mizes pro￿ts in the foreign market (see (17)) by setting its export prices according to
(18). As the shadow price on country 2￿ s budget constraint satis￿es ￿￿ = p￿
d=(c￿
d+1)











12for the export prices. Using now the optimality condition (16), the monopolist





The free entry conditions in both countries require then ￿d + ￿f = w￿ in the ￿rst
and ￿￿
d + ￿￿
f = w￿￿ in the second country.
3.2.1 Two Symmetric Countries
It will prove instructive to look at the model under symmetry and to consider trade
relations between two equally sized countries (L = L￿). In this simple case wages
equalize and monopolist prices in the domestic and foreign markets are




where the asterisk can be dropped because of symmetry. Optimal consumption
choice (16) then implies
cd + 1 =
p
￿(cf + 1) (28)
whenever trade volumes are positive (cf > 0). The condition for trade to be positive
is clearly cd >
p




￿ ￿ 1 (29)
In contrast to the standard model, ￿nite tari⁄s can, if they are high enough, make
bilateral trade volumes fall to zero. This is obviously a direct implication of the
bounded marginal utility: when the ratio of marginal utilities exceeds the relative
price, the more expensive variety drops out of the consumption bundle. While this
cannot occur when marginal utilities approach in￿nity as quantities tend to zero it
is well possible in the present setting.
Not surprisingly, higher tari⁄s tend to prevent trade ￿ ows between countries
and may impede trade altogether. At the same time, a larger population L tends
to impede trade since it increases the number of domestic ￿rms, reduces per capita
consumption of each variety and thus depresses the consumer￿ s willingness to incur
the transport costs to purchase an additional, foreign variety. Further, an increase
in the ratio of setup costs and marginal cost (￿=￿) decreases the number of local
￿rms, increases per capita consumption of each and thus makes the consumer willing
to pay for more for foreign varieties.
7Firms make less pro￿t in foreign than in domestic markets for two reasons. First, and foremost,
demand in the foreign market is lower since consumer prices, which bear additional transport costs,
are higher. Second, a lower per capita demand induces a higher own-price elasticity and therefore
depresses markups and pro￿ts in foreign markets. See also Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005) for a
microfoundation and empirical evidence on this point.
13The symmetric equilibrium is solved by using condition (28) to write the oper-
ating pro￿ts from the export market (26) as
￿f = L(cd + 1 ￿
p
￿)2w￿ (30)
Free entry to production requires that global operating pro￿ts just cover the setup
cost
￿ = ￿d + ￿f = Lw￿
￿
c2


















Each individual consumes cd of a domestically produced variety, this quantity in-
creases in the ratio of setup cost and marginal productivity (￿=￿).
The resource constraint in the tradable sector (n[￿x+￿] = ￿L) and goods market





















This expression can be shown to be increasing in the trade cost ￿: The positive
relation between the level of trade cost and the number of active ￿rms per country
re￿ ects the ￿nding discussed in connection with equation (22). In a closed economy,
the doubling of the labor force induces a less than proportional increase in the total
number of ￿rms. Now, a doubling of the labor force in a closed economy is equivalent
to a move of a given country from autarky to full trade integration with an identical
country. Thus, in such a situation the number of ￿rms per country must fall. Finally,
when the move from autarky to trade integration takes place via gradual trade cost
reduction, the above equation shows that the drop in active ￿rms per country is in
fact monotonous.
With per capita consumption and the number of ￿rms established, one can now
turn to the volume of trade. The import share, de￿ned as nominal imports over

















in the two countries. This expression is decreasing in the country size (L) and
increasing in the ratio of setup cost and marginal productivity (￿=￿). For an intu-
ition of this result note that a smaller population L and a larger ratio ￿=￿ tend to
14increase per capita consumption of the domestic variety. Further remember that,
as discussed in connection with equation (29), demand for foreign varieties falls to
zero when domestic per capita consumption is too high. Thus, starting from very
low trade volumes, any parameter change that increases per capita consumption of
domestic varieties must induce a more than proportional increase in per capita con-
sumption of a foreign variety. In fact, the choice of the demand structure (14) implies
that increases in per capita consumption of foreign varieties are over-proportionate
along the whole range of parameters. (Take derivatives of equation (28) to see that
dln(cd) < dln(cf)). As prices stay constant in the symmetric equilibrium, this
means that the expenditure share on foreign varieties grows.
Notice in particular that improvements of marginal productivity lead to increases
in the trade share.
This symmetric model can be brought to the data. The population of the US
and the rest of the world (ROW) are supposed to be of equal size. Both labor
forces evolve according to US population growth. US per capita income is taken as
a proxy for the technological change, which is moreover assumed to a⁄ect marginal
productivity only (i.e. US per capita income ￿ 1=￿). Trade costs are assumed to
be the sum of tari⁄s and the cif/fob values plus 40%. The initial value of ￿ and the
trade share ￿ are jointly used to calibrate the import shares to the data at the initial
and ￿nal period. With (￿;￿) = (0:49;15) the ￿t of the trade share is satisfactory.
The implied import elasticity takes an average value of 6:8 with a maximum of 14:8
at the start of the period and a minimum of 3:9 at the end of it. This can be read
as an improvement of the ￿t compared to the standard New Trade Model. The
average implied import elasticity, however, is by far larger than the target of 2 to
3 Yi (2003) argues to be reasonable. The next paragraphs shall explore to what
extent the imposed symmetry can be blamed for this failure.
3.2.2 Two Asymmetric Countries
In the general case of two asymmetric countries the monopolists￿prices in the do-
mestic and foreign markets are given, respectively, by (23) and (25). The full set of
prices is then












Provided that trade volumes are positive, optimal consumer choice (16) then implies
cd + 1 =
p
￿w￿=w(cf + 1) and c￿
d + 1 =
p
￿w=w￿(c￿
f + 1) (34)
The condition for trade volumes to be positive is then cf,c￿
f > 0 or,with (21) and
(34)
(￿=(￿L) + 1)(￿=(￿L￿) + 1) > ￿ (35)
15Finally, the monopolists￿operating pro￿ts in the respective markets are as in (24)
and (26)
￿d = w￿Lc2








so that the free entry conditions become
Lc2
d + L￿￿(c￿
f)2 = ￿=￿ and L￿(c￿
d)2 + L￿c2
f = ￿=￿ (37)








= L and n￿ [(L￿c￿
d + L￿cf)￿ + ￿] = L￿ (38)






f = n￿L(cd + 1)cf (39)










d + L￿cf + ￿=￿
(40)
while eliminating relative wages in (34) leads to
(cd + 1)(c￿
d + 1) = ￿(cf + 1)(c￿
f + 1) (41)
The four equations (37), (40), and (41) jointly determine the quantities cd, cf, c￿
d,
and c￿
f. This is a nonlinear system which has no analytic solution and needs to be
solved numerically. One can, however, show the following




Given these quantities cd, cf, c￿
d, and c￿










and equations (38) deliver the number of ￿rms active in either country, which ￿nally











This asymmetric model can be brought to the data. Assume there are two coun-
tries with relative labor forces corresponding to those of the US and the ROW.
16Technology (1=￿) is proxied by real US per capita income and trade cost is assumed
to be the sum of US tari⁄s and the cif/fob values plus 40%. The initial value of ￿
and the trade share ￿ are jointly used to calibrate the import shares to the data
at the initial and of the period. The results, however, do not di⁄er much from the
calibration in the previous symmetric model. The mean of the implied elasticity is
about the same as before (6.9) while its variance is higher with the maximum value
of 24 and a minimum of 2.9. In sum, introducing asymmetry to the model does not
contribute to a solution of the "elasticity puzzle".
3.3 A Symmetric Multicountry World (I > 2)
Take now an economy with I countries, which are all identical in terms of labor
force. Pairs of countries di⁄er regarding the respective transportation cost they face
when engaging in bilateral trade, but to reap the virtues of symmetry assume ￿nally
that countries are symmetric in terms of potential trade partners. In particular, the
vector of gross iceberg trade cost ￿i = (￿i1;￿i2;:::;￿iI) is, up to reordering, identical
across countries i (i.e. for all i;k 2 I there is a permutation ￿ : I ! I so that
￿(￿i) = ￿k). As all parameters that govern demand and supply are identical across
countries, producer prices and wages equalize throughout countries.
The bounded marginal utility from varieties implies, just like in the two-country
model, that there is a threshold on the transportation cost ￿ ￿ above which there is




￿ ￿ ￿ 1 (42)
Obviously, the set of country 1￿ s trade partners consists of those countries with
whom bilateral trade is least expensive.
Consider now, say, country 1 and denote by M the set of countries it engages
in bilateral trade with (M includes the country 1 itself). With monopolist prices
parallel to (27), the optimal consumer choice requires
c11 + 1 =
p
￿1k(c1k + 1) k 2 M (43)
The pro￿t a ￿rm j located in country 1 makes in the market k 2 M is parallel to







Lw￿ (c11 ￿ (
p
￿1k ￿ 1))































Here, in slight abuse of notation, M stands for the set of trade partners and for the
number of trade partners at the same time. Note that M is an endogenous variable
that eventually depends on the schedule of bilateral trade costs. Formally, one has
a problem of circular de￿nition, i.e. M is de￿ned as
M = fk 2 I j
p
￿1k < c11 + 1g (46)
while c11 depends on M itself. One can show, however, the following
Proposition 2 The set M is nonempty and uniquely de￿ned by (46).
Proof. Assume wlog that the elements of the vector ￿1 are ordered according to
ascending size. Then note that ￿1l ￿ ￿1k implies k 2 M ) l 2 M. Consequently,
any solution to (46) must be of the form f1;2;:::;ng for one n 2 I. Finally, de￿ne
cn by (44) under M = f1;2;:::;ng. Observe that cn is decreasing in n, so that
the sequence de￿ned by mn = max
￿
k 2 I j
p
￿1k < cn + 1
￿
is decreasing in n. By
construction the set f1;:::;ng with n satisfying mn ￿ n and mn+1 ￿ n + 1 solves
(46)). As mn is a monotonically falling sequence, there is maximal one such n and
since f1g 2 M, the set M is nonempty.
With the equilibrium per capita quantities of domestic varieties well de￿ned,


























Finally, using again consumers￿optimality condition (43) and (45), the trade share
of country 1 can be expressed as


















Equations (46) and (48) determine the representative country￿ s number of trade
partners and its trade share, the two key trade parameters which the present model
aims to explain.
18The set of a country￿ s trade partners M depends on the model￿ s parameters and
may be any subset of the full set of countries I satisfying f1g ￿ M. Just as in
the two-country world, trade costs can, if they are too high, impede bilateral trade.
Intuition from the two-country model above suggests that the inclination to pay for
foreign varieties increases with the per capita consumption of the domestic varieties,
as decreasing marginal utility from domestic varieties raises consumer￿ s willingness
to pay for the more expensive foreign ones. As population size L decreases and the
ratio ￿=￿ increases per capita consumption of a domestic variety, one can conjecture
that these parameters drive the contraction or expansion of the set of trade partners.
The main variable of interest, the trade share (48) is equally expected to rise in
the ratio ￿=(￿L) not only since per capita consumption of foreign varieties increase
relatively more than domestic varieties, but also because the set of trade partners
expands. The dimension of trade partners - or source countries - constitutes an extra
margin along which trade volumes expand and ampli￿es the ￿rst e⁄ect.
The above considerations regarding the number of trade partners and the trade
share prove right and the impact of population size and technology on these variables
is summarized in the following
Proposition 3 The trade share e and the number of trade partners M increases in
￿=(￿L).
Proof. Note ￿rst that for any change in the set M condition (42) must be satis￿ed
for the newcomer (dropout). Thus, the trade share as e = 1￿ c11
Mc11￿TM;1 is continuous
at any change in the set M. By this observation and (45) it is su¢ cient to prove
that the equilibrium c11 is increasing in ￿=(￿L). By (45) this is trivially the case
whenever M is constant.
For any change in the set M consider wlog an increase in M. De￿ne m as the
index of the lowest bilateral iceberg trade cost outside the set of trade partners, i.e.
m =argmink2InM f￿1kg. Whenever M increases condition
p
￿1m = c11+1 must hold
and equation (44) is satis￿ed for both of the two sets M and M [ fmg, implying
that c11 is continuous. As the set of changes in M is countable, this proves that c11
is increasing in ￿=(￿L).
Proposition 3 shows that the rise in trade share and the expansion of the set of
trade partners are jointly driven by productivity growth at the margin. When the
e⁄ect of this joint determinant is strong, it can induce a strong positive correlation
between the rises in trade volumes and the number of source countries per good
as exhibited by the data (see Figures 3 and 4). Moreover, it implies the common
dynamics between per capita income and trade volumes that Ventura (2005) points
to. Remember that the standard model of the New Trade Theory failed to address
any of these patterns of the trade data, so that the results presented in Proposition
3 constitute a considerable advance towards reconciling the theory with the data.
19The sole departure from the standard setup was to assume that consumers derive
only bounded marginal utility from varieties at zero consumption levels. Up to this
point, however, the results remain purely qualitative and to complete the picture it
is necessary to know how the model performs quantitatively, i.e. to evaluate whether
it can jointly address the level and the rise in trade shares, the number of source
countries per good and per capita income at reasonable import elasticity.
To this end the model will be calibrated to the US trade shares. An important
parameter in the calibration is the import elasticity to tari⁄s, which is de￿ned as




where Q stands for the total imported quantity. With the optimal consumer choice










￿1k ￿ (M ￿ 1)
￿ + ￿L[c11(TM;1 + M) ￿ TM;2 ￿ TM;1]
!
Now, how does this model square the data? To evaluate its performance a parallel
exercise to that of the standard New Trade Model in section 2 is performed. The
symmetric model of 20 identical economies is fed with population and trade cost data
of the US between 1972 and 2000 (the US population equals about 1/20 of the world
population in the time interval considered). Each country has a set of 19 potential
trade partners and faces a vector of bilateral trade costs, which is assumed to be, up
to reordering, identical across countries and is denoted by ￿ = (￿1;￿2;:::;￿M￿1).
The ￿m are ordered according to ascending values. Finally, the bilateral trade costs
are a composite of tari⁄s t and transportation cost ￿ and are assumed to take the
linear form ￿m = 1:4+t+￿ (m=(M ￿ 1))
￿. For each period, the value ￿ is chosen so
that the cif/fob measure implied by the model coincides with measure from the data.
The parameter ￿ and the initial marginal productivity ￿1972 are chosen to calibrate
the trade shares to the data at the initial and ￿nal period of the time interval
considered. Figure 5b shows that with (￿;￿1972;￿) = (0:15;14:39;1:9) the multi-
country model follows the time series satisfactorily with about the same success as
the two-country model. A big improvement, however, concerns the implied import
elasticity, which now assumes a time-average of 3.7 with a peak of 8.8 at the start of
the period and a minimum of 1.75 at the end of it. While the variance is high, the
average import elasticity is close to the interval [2,3], which Yi (2003) puts forward
as a realistic range.
The reason for this substantial improvement is the extension of trade along the
dimension of source countries. Driven by improvements of marginal productivity
(1=￿), consumers purchase not only larger quantities form previous trade partners
(as in the two-country model) but open new trade relations and extend the number of
source countries. Figure 5b illustrates these dynamics and compares the predictions
20of the model to that of the data (values in 1972 are normalized). This additional
margin along which trade expands ampli￿es the impact of technological change,
which therefore explains a larger part of the increase in trade shares. The remaining
part to be accounted for by the reductions in trade cost therefore shrinks, and the
implied import elasticity falls.
As in the standard New Trade Model with 20 countries, the measured cif/fob
values and the implied "real" transport cost ￿ di⁄er considerably. The reason for
this is now twofold. First, as in the standard model, an exogenous drop in ￿ induces
consumers to increase their purchases of foreign varieties relatively more. Second,
and in addition, the model with bounded marginal utility predicts that increases in
marginal productivity induce consumers to buy from more distant locations. Both
of these e⁄ects tend to increase the expenditure on transportation, and induce an
upward bias of the conventional cif/fob measure of trade cost from the ￿ real￿values
so that the implied latter ones fall by more that the data suggest.8 Despite this
second amplifying e⁄ect that stems from the technological change, the fraction of
the rise in trade shares explained by the drop in transportation is now 44%, which is
still larger than what the estimations of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) imply (around
one fourth, about a third of the impact that tari⁄s have), yet much below the 80%
the standard New Trade Model of the previous section implied.
In sum, the model can explain two strong and important trends of trade data at
reasonable parameter values: ￿rst, the massive growth of trade shares at a modest
fall of trade costs and second the small fraction of trade relations that the average
country engages in. It suggests technological progress as the core determinant of
both variables and thereby generates two additional patterns of international trade
data: ￿rst, the correlation between trade shares and per capita income and second,
the correlation between the increases of trade volumes and the number of source
countries.
Two clarifying remarks are necessary. The ￿rst one concerns the nature of pro-
ductivity growth, which was assumed to a⁄ect manufacturing e¢ ciency only and
leave entry cost unchanged. The model￿ s direct implication that stronger increas-
ing returns (i.e. a higher ratio of setup cost over marginal cost) imply larger trade
volumes is con￿rmed empirically in a cross section analysis by Harrigan (1994). A
time-series analysis, however, that justi￿es this central assumption and could lend
support to the hypothesis of a strong causal e⁄ect of productivity growth on trade
volumes is still to be performed. The second remark concerns previous attempts to
evaluate the role of non-homothetic preferences on trade volumes. These e⁄ects are
generally estimated to be small (see Bergstrand (1990) and Bergoeing and Kehoe
8Given that these e⁄ects are strong, conventional measures tend to substantially understate the
drop in trade costs. It may be worth analyzing these systematic measurement problems in detail in
empirical paper. In particular, an evaluation of their role in estimates as in Baier and Bergstrand
(1999) seems in order. However, such an analysis is outside the scope of the present paper.
21(2003) among others). However, these quantitative studies are consistently based
on Stone-Geary type preferences between a homogeneous good and a composite
of varieties. Consequently, they su⁄er from the drawback of the Krugman (1980)
model in a slightly modi￿ed version: any country with positive trade share imports
all tradable varieties from all other trading countries. Thus, these models rule out
the existence of a non-trivial fraction of imported varieties over world tradables and
thereby cannot explain an endogenous expansion of the set of trade partners. The
di⁄erence between the performance of the two-country and the multi-country model
has made clear, however, that this expansion of the set of trade partners contributes
signi￿cantly to the success of the calibration. This qualitative di⁄erence may explain
the strong discrepancy between the ￿ndings of previous work and the present paper.
It ￿nally suggests that future empirical studies should include the e⁄ect that stems
from an expansion of the set of trade partners.
3.4 An Asymmetric Multicountry World
This ￿nal generalization of the model considers the multi-country model under asym-
metric country size and trade costs. Denote country i￿ s vector of gross iceberg trade
cost with ￿i = (￿i1;￿i2;:::;￿iI). For the sake of generality, assume that productivity
may di⁄er across countries, i.e. ￿ and ￿ are indexed by i. Pro￿t maximization then
leads to the monopolist prices
pki = (cik + 1)￿kwk








whenever cij and cik are positive. Note that consumption of domestic varieties is not
necessarily positive, as relative prices can vary dramatically with wage di⁄erentials,
which, in turn, are determined by relative country sizes, trade costs and technology.
Further, the set of countries country i imports from (Mi) does not need to




so that varieties from io are the cheapest in country i. Then write
Mi =
n













22With the monopolist prices pik = (cki + 1)￿wi of ￿rms in country i selling in
market k, generic pro￿ts from market k are still
￿ik = Lk￿ik￿iwic2
ki




ki = ￿i=￿i (52)








5 = Li (53)
and ￿nally the trade balance is ni
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Lk￿ki(cik + 1)cik P
m2Ek Lm￿km(cmk + 1)cmk
(54)
The system de￿ned by (49) - (54) jointly determine the wages fwigi2I, the consumed
quantities fcikgi;k2I the number of active ￿rms in each country fnigi2I and the sets
of supplied and supplying countries fEigi2I and fMigi2I.
A full characterization of this general case is beyond the scope of this paper and
is left for future research.
4 Conclusion
This paper has shown that a small and realistic twist in the demand structure goes
a long way in explaining four strong and important empirical regularities that the
workhorse model of the New Trade Theory fails to explain. These empirical patterns
are the massive rise in trade shares, the small fraction of traded varieties countries
import, the correlation between trade growth and per capita growth, and the parallel
rise in the number of source countries per imported good and trade volumes, and
￿nally the correlation between trade growth and per capita growth. By the paper￿ s
key assumption marginal utility derived from each variety is bounded. This implies
that varieties whose transport is very costly drop out of the individual￿ s consumption
basket. Technological progress that induces a higher per capita consumption of
23those varieties already consumed decreases the marginal utility derived from them
and makes consumers expand their consumption basket towards more expensive,
foreign varieties. Therefore, such technological progress drives up the number of
source countries per good, the trade share, and per capita income.
24A Appendix







1￿" = 1 (A1)
is homogeneous of degree zero in the wages and a potential solution can be normal-
ized by setting w1 = 1.
Now con￿rm that each term on the LHS of (A1) is decreasing in wi and increasing
in wk k 6= i and that LHS! 0 (wi ! 1) and LHS! 1 (wi ! 0) and hence for
every vector (w2;:::;wi￿1;wi+1;:::;wI) 2 RI￿1
+ there is a unique solution
wi = ’i(w2;:::;wi￿1;wi+1;:::;wI)
satisfying (A1). Moreover, the function ’i : RI￿2
+ ! R+ is strictly increasing in all
arguments.
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and is strictly in-
creasing in all arguments, as the functions ’i are so. Thus,
￿(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::;￿1=￿ ￿"￿1) ￿ (￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::;￿1=￿ ￿"￿1)
25holds component by component. Applying ￿ to both sides leads to ￿2(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::) ￿
￿(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::) and by induction to
￿m+1(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::;￿1=￿ ￿"￿1) ￿ ￿m(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::;￿1=￿ ￿"￿1)
so that, as each component of ￿m is bounded above, the monotone components of
￿m+1(￿1=￿ ￿"￿1;:::;￿1=￿ ￿"￿1) converge to (w￿
2;:::;w￿
I). This proves the existence of
a ￿xpoint of ￿, which by construction is a solution to (A1).
Existence and Uniqueness of a solution to system (37), (40), and (41). First



















with the function cf (c￿
f) decreasing in c￿









The LHS is increasing in cd and in c￿
d. so that cd = g(c￿
d) is a decreasing function.




























By the above observations the LHS is decreasing in cd with LHS! 1 as cd ! ￿=(￿L)
and LHS! ￿1 as c￿
d ! ￿=(￿L￿). Thus, there is a unique solution for cd and, solving
backward, for c￿
d and ￿nally for cf and c￿
f.
B References
Anderson J. 1979: "A Theoretical Foundation of the Gravity Equation" American
Economic Review, Vol. 69, 1, pp. 106-116
Anderson J. and van Wincoop E. 2003: "Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle" American Economic Review, Vol. 93, 1, pp. 170-192
Anderson J. and van Wincoop E. 2004: "Trade Costs" Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, Volume 42, No. 3, pp. 691-751
Baier, S. and Bergstrand, J. 2001: "The Growth of World Trade: Tari⁄s, Transport
Costs, and Income Similarity" Journal of International Economics, Vol. 53, pp.
1-27
Backus, D., Kehoe, P., and Kydland, F. 1994: "Dynamics of the Trade Balance and
the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve?" American Economic Review, Vol. 84, 1, pp.
84-103
26Baumol, W. J. 1973: "Income and Substitution E⁄ects in the Linder Theorem"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 629-633
Bergoeing R., Kehoe T. J., Strauss-Kahn V., and Yi K-M 2004: "Why Is Manufac-
turing Trade Rising Even as Manufacturing Output is Falling?" American Economic
Review, 94, pp. 134-138
Bergoeing R. and Kehoe T. J. 2003: "Trade Theory and Trade Facts" Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Sta⁄ Report 284
Bergstrand, J. 1990: "The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model, the Linder Hypothe-
sis, and the Determinants of Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade" Economic Journal, Vol.
100, pp. 1216-1229
Broda, Christian and Weinstein, David E. 2004: "Globalization and the Gains From
Variety" NBER WP10314
Broda, Christian and Weinstein, David E. 2004: "Variety Growth and World Wel-
fare" American Economic Review, Vol. 94, 2, pp. 139-144
Corsetti, G., Martin, P. and Pesenti, P. 2005: "Productivity Spillovers, Terms of
Trade and the ￿ Home Market E⁄ect￿ " NBER WP 11165
Chaney, T., 2006: "Distorted Gravity: Heterogeneous Firms, Market Structure and
the Geography of International Trade" mimeo.
Cuæat, A., and Ma⁄ezzoli, M. 2003: "Can Comparative Advantage Explain the
Growth of US Trade?" IGIER WP 241
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S., and Samuelson P. A. 1980: "Heckscher-Ohlin Trade
Theory with a Continuum of Goods" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No.
2, pp. 203-224
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S., and Samuelson P. A. 1977: "Comparative Advantage,
Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods" American
Economic Review, Vol. 67, No. 5, pp. 823-839
Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. 2002: "Technology, Geography, and Trade" Econometrica
Vol. 70, No. 5, pp. 1741-1779
Evenett, S. J., and A. J. Venables, 2002: "Export Growth in Developing Countries:
Market Entry and Bilateral Trade Flows" mimeo
Feenstra, R., Romalis, J., and Schott, P. 2002. "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tari⁄
Data 1989-2001" NBER WP 9387.
Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R., Deng, H., Ma, A., and Mo, H. 2005: "World Trade Flows
1962-2000" NBER WP 11040.
Harrigan, J. 1994: "Scale Economies and the Volume of Trade" Review of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 76, pp. 321-328
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. 1985: Trade Policy and Market Structure, MIT press,
Massachusetts
27Haveman, J. and Hummels, D., 1999: "Alternative Hypothesis and the Volume of
Trade: Evidence on the Extent of Specialization", Purdue University
Hummels, D. 1999: "Have Internatioanl Transportation Costs Declined?" University
of Chicago
Hummels, D., and Klenow, P. J., 2005: "The Variety and Quality of a Nation￿ s
Exports" American Economic Review, 93, 3, pp. 704-723
Hunter, L. C., and Markusen, J. R.: "Per-Capita Income As a Determinant of
Trade", in Feenstra, R. (ed.) Empirical Methods for International Trade, MIT
Press 1988
Kehoe, T. and Ruhl, K. 2002: "How Important is the New Goods Margin in Inter-
natioanl Trade?" Sta⁄ Report 324, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Klenow, P. J., and Rodr￿guez-Clare, A. 1997: "Quantifying the Gains fron Trade
Liberalization", mimeo Stanford University
Krugman, P. 1980: "Scale Economies, Product Di⁄erentiation, and the Pattern of
Trade" American Economic Review, 70, pp. 950-959
Krugman, P. 1995: "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences" Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 327-376
Melitz, M. 2003: "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggre-
gate Industry Productivity" Econometrica Vol. 71, No. 6, pp. 1695-1725
Melitz, M. and Ottaviano, G. 2005: "Market Size, Trade, and Productiity" NBER
WP 11393
Ruhl, K. 2005: "Solving the Elasticity Puzzle in International Economics" mimeo
University of Texas at Austin
Schmitt, N. and Yu, Z. 2002: "Horizontal Intra-Industry Trade and the Growth of
International Trade" University of Nottingham, mimeo
Thursby, J. G. and Thursby, M. C. 1987: "Bilateral Trade Flows, the Linder Hy-
pothesis, and Exchange Risk" Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, No. 3,
pp. 488-495
Stokey, N. 1988: "Learning by Doing and the Introduction of New Goods" Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 96, pp. 701-717
Ventura, J. 2006: "A Global View of Economic Growth" Handbook of Economic
Growth, vol. 1B, Aghion P. and Durlauf S. N. (eds.), Elsevier B. V.
Yi, K.-M. 2003: "Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111, No.1, pp. 52-102
Young, A. 1991: "Learning by Doing and the Dynamic E⁄ects of International
Trade" Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, pp. 369-405
28